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I. INTRODUCTION
In today's push-button, instant gratification world, real-time decisions
and actions are required and indispensable.1 Furthermore, the costs of litigation
have increased exponentially.2 Employers increasingly are requiring employees
to sign arbitration agreements as a condition of employment. 3 As a result, the
pre-printed employment contract has become as much a part of the American
workplace as the annoying guy with the comb-over who wants to talk about how
his Saturday night blind date left before dessert.
The agreement to submit claims to arbitration, now a standard clause in
most employment contracts, has been in existence for some time but has re-
cently become a hotly contested area of law.4 In the employment context, em-
ployees agree to forgo claims in the traditional judicial forum and thus the con-
stitutional guarantee of a jury trial, instead settling for adjudication through an
arbitrator.5 Scholars and litigants have exhausted hours trying to determine the
legal force of such agreements.6
For example, imagine a young West Virginia woman, Heroine, anxious
to achieve some financial independence from her parents in order to buy a pair
of brown leather heels and matching clutch that were previously cost-
prohibitive, accepts employment at the local Burger Bliss as evening shift cash-
ier. Having recently celebrated her eighteenth birthday, she proudly signs her
own name (for the first time) to her employment contract. Although a high-end
outfit such as Burger Bliss is not likely to have any disagreement with its moti-
vated workforce, the company, like most, still requires employee contracts to
contain arbitration agreements to settle any dispute that may arise.
Heroine has a co-worker, Chester, who, after years of dedicated Burger
Bliss service, has worked his way up to manager of the evening shift. Unfortu-
nately, Chester, wearing his formerly white, short-sleeved, button-down Burger
Bliss shirt and thin moustache informs Heroine that she will soon be fired unless
I Laura Kaplan Plourde, Note, Analysis of Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams in Light of Pre-
vious Supreme Court Decisions: An Inconsistent Interpretation of the Scope and Exemption Pro-
visions of the Federal Arbitration Act, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 145, 147 (2003).
2 Id. at 147 n. I (citing David L. Gregory, The Supreme Court's Labor and Employment Law
Jurisprudence, 1999-2001, 36 TULSA L. REV. 515 (2001)).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 147. "The issue of mandatory arbitration of employment disputes has garnered much
attention from lawyers, judges, academia, business professionals, and employee rights groups ...
"d.
5 Sd. at 147 n. .6 See Gregory, supra note 2, at 544.
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she becomes intimately acquainted with him. Embarrassed and trapped by her
boss's ultimatum, she regretfully relents.
Later, after consulting Hero, her lawyer, she decides to file suit against
Burger Bliss for sexual harassment. Hero, experienced in employment dis-
crimination cases, plans to allege a violation of the West Virginia Human Rights
Act.7 Reviewing Heroine's employment contract, Hero realizes that it contains
the dreaded arbitration clause. Hoping to avoid the less sympathetic Burger
Bliss-appointed arbitrator, Hero delves into his research to find just how en-
forceable the arbitration clause is going to be in the face of a statutory civil
rights violation. What Hero will find is a major conflict between West Virginia
law and United States Supreme Court decisions.
Hopefully, Hero's arguments will persuade the West Virginia courts to
stick to their guns. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held in Cop-
ley v. NCR Corp. that the West Virginia legislature created a private cause of
action under the West Virginia Human Rights Act and intended those claims to
be heard by a jury.R Arbitration of human rights claims is against the policy
evidenced by the West Virginia act. 9 Furthermore, as a precondition to em-
ployment, arbitration agreements are rarely, if ever, the result of bargaining be-
tween equal parties, and are usually advantageous to the employer.'0 Although
unconscionability arguments have been widely rejected, the West Virginia court
has given plaintiffs some solace in the fact that Human Rights Act violations
will rightfully be brought in front of their peers and resolved in public.
On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court has been much less
receptive. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp." the Supreme Court re-
jected the idea that claims arising under federal civil rights statutes must be tried
in a public forum, and allowed a federal age discrimination claim to be forced to
arbitration. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Southland Corp.
v. Keating2 stands for the proposition that the nondescript Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) 13 preempts state laws that prevent arbitration for certain claims.
Therefore, West Virginia's stance on arbitration may be tenable.
However, West Virginia should not budge. Arbitration, although ar-
guably a more efficient and expedient forum, presents public policy concerns.
Forcing discrimination claims to arbitration stifles the development of anti-
discrimination laws because arbitrations are private matters and no record of
decision or evidence of discrimination is disseminated through public channels.
7 W. VA. CODE § 5-11-1, et seq. (2002). This act protects employees from workplace dis-
crimination and sexual harassment, among other vital civil fights protections.
8 394 S.E.2d 751, 755-56 (W. Va. 1990). See infra Part III.A.
9 Id.
10 Id.
i 500 U.S. 20 (1991). See also infra Part III.C.
12 465 U.S. 1 (1984). See also infra Part IV.A.
13 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (2000). See also infra Part II.A.
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Furthermore, employee-plaintiffs are disadvantaged because employers usually
control the process, employers get the "repeat player" advantage, and adminis-
trative costs of arbitration are relatively higher on the employee. '4
Section II of this Note examines the arguments both for and against pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in employment contracts.15 Section III examines
the conflict between West Virginia decisions and United States Supreme Court
decisions involving the enforceability of arbitration agreements. In Section IV,
this Note will examine the viability of the West Virginia stance on arbitration in
light of intervening developments in both United States Supreme Court and
West Virginia case law. '
6
Section V will make suggestions to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals on which direction to pursue in order to ensure that employee-plaintiffs
are not unjustly deprived of their constitutional and statutory right to a jury trial.
Hopefully, West Virginia will remain vibrant in its stance that violations of the
Human Rights Act are not subject to arbitration clauses. Accordingly, Hero will
not be constrained by arbitration and will be able to obtain justice to the fullest
extent for our Heroine. Section VI concludes the Note.
II. "TRUE REFLECTIONS": BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON ARBITRATIONS
This section will provide a backdrop of information of all relevant statu-
tory and case law necessary to understanding the interplay of federal and state
laws regarding arbitration and employee civil rights. Subpart A will examine the
background and history of the Federal Arbitration Act. Subpart B will present
the respective arguments over the fairness of the arbitration process. Subpart C
will bring to light due process concerns raised by the fact that arbitration implies
a waiver of a traditional judicial forum, and Subpart D will briefly introduce the
West Virginia Human Rights Act.
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
Arbitration agreements have provided an increasingly utilized method
of resolving disputes since the fourteenth century.' 7 During the European Mid-
dle Ages, trade groups organized and set community standards and practices for
trade. 18 In order to enforce these standards, the trade groups organized the first
14 See infra Part II.C.
15 This Note is only concerned with arbitration in the non-union context. Bargaining power
concerns and fairness issues become less accentuated when employees are represented by collec-
tive bargaining.
16 See Copley, 394 S.E.2d 751.
17 See Karen Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REv. 931, 969-70 (1999).
18 Id. at 970.
[Vol. 108
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arbitration processes and procedures. 19 Community elders, drawing on local
norms, arbitrated and resolved disputes.2°
Arbitrations in the United States began in much the same way. Ameri-
can trade groups formed arbitration arrangements mainly to settle disputes aris-
ing within a particular industry. 2' This alternative means to settling disputes
was advantageous to the members of the trade groups because it was quick, effi-
cient, and less costly and onerous than traditional judicial resolution.22 Due to
these advantages, arbitration became commonplace.23 In 1927, over 1000 trade
associations had arbitration processes in place to settle disputes among their
members.24 However, arbitration agreements soon found a formidable foe in the
American judiciary.
Although arbitration clauses were included in employment contracts
early in American jurisprudence, courts were not ready to enforce a clause that
supplanted their jurisdiction over a dispute. 5 The doctrine known as "the old
judicial hostility to arbitration" was founded upon the theory that arbitration was
not an affirmative defense to a contract action.26 Additionally, courts of equity
were unwilling to stay proceedings because of arbitration agreements. 27 Fur-
thermore, based on the theory that the arbitrator was the agent of both parties,
courts ruled that arbitration agreements were revocable by either party before
the imposition of an arbitration award.28
As a result, trade groups pooled their resources in order to seek a legis-
lative remedy in Washington, D.C.2 9 In the early 1920's, trade groups presented
Congress with alternate plans aimed at correcting the judicial hostility towards
arbitration. 30 The first plan was patterned after procedures in the state of Illi-
nois.3 1 A New York statute was the model for the second plan.32
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 971.
22 Id. at 970-71.
23 See id. at 971-73.
24 Id. at 970.
25 David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Su-
preme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 16 (2004). See also
Stone, supra note 17, at 973.
26 Schwartz, supra note 25, at 16-17.
27 Id. at 17.
28 Id. at 16-17.
29 See Stone, supra note 17, at 985-86.
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The Illinois statute enforced only arbitration agreements that were con-
summated after the dispute arose.33 Illinois also allowed de novo judicial review
of all arbitration awards. 34 The New York statute enforced all disputes, regard-
less of whether the arbitration agreement was signed before or after the dis-
pute. 35 Judicial review was narrowly limited to cases where the arbitrator com-
mitted a clearly erroneous application of the substantive laws.36 After intense
lobbying from trade associations, Congress adopted the New York version al-
most verbatim, passing the Federal Arbitration Act37 (FAA) in 1925.38
Since the passage of the FAA, the attitude of American courts has
changed considerably. Early on, courts were unwilling to relinquish jurisdiction
over cases. 39 Now, with the modem explosion of litigation, courts are more than
willing to let others resolve disputes.40 Courts are overworked, and dockets are
jammed. 4' Therefore, it is less than surprising that the U.S. Supreme Court has
tended to come down on the pro-arbitration side of the fence.
Although arbitration agreements arguably may be unfairly imposed on
employees, the FAA was an important and necessary piece of legislation. The
hostility towards arbitration was a major restraint on the freedom of parties to
contract and evidence of unwarranted paternalism. However, Congress would
have been well advised to adopt the Illinois rule, which allows arbitration only if
the agreement to arbitrate was entered into after the dispute arose.42 Parties
should be free to contract so long as both parties are fully aware of the terms of
the agreement and the facts underlying the dispute at hand. In pre-injury arbitra-
33 Id. at 985-86.
34 See id. at 982-86.
35 Id.
36 See id. at 982-84.
37 9 U.S.C. § 1. The operative language in the Act is as follows:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereaf-
ter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration
an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id. § 2.
38 Stone, supra note 17, at 986.
39 See Thomas A. Manakides, Note, Arbitration of "Public Injunctions": Clash Between State
Statutory Remedies and the Federal Arbitration Act, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 433, 434 (2003).
40 Id at 433-35. "It seems to me that judges who have let their concern for their own crowded
docket overcome their concern for the rights they are entrusted with should step aside and let
someone else assume their burdens." Id. (quoting Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 940-41
(Mont. 1994)).
41 Id.
42 See supra text accompanying note 33.
[Vol. 108
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tion agreements, the parties are unaware of the factual situations that give rise to
a dispute.
Returning to our story, would Heroine ever have agreed to arbitration
after Chester illegally propositioned her? A party should not be forced into arbi-
tration simply because she lacks the ability to see into the future. In truth, em-
ployees are unlikely to understand the consequences of the arbitration agree-
ment, and it is nearly impossible that an employee will foresee the circum-
stances that will provoke its use.
B. "What Would You Say?": Are Plaintiffs Better Off in Court or Arbitra-
tion?
As a general statement, plaintiffs' attorneys and civil rights advocates
think of arbitration as a hindrance to complete justice and thorn in the side of an
employee's civil rights. To the defense bar and big business, it is an efficient,
cost-saving forum that can diminish the impact and influence of lawyers. Both
sides of the argument wrangle facts, figures, and statistics in order to buttress
their respective positions.43
Therefore, it is important to view any statistical analysis with a large
grain of salt. It is an extreme overgeneralization to say that plaintiffs are better
off in either forum. Each case is different, and each plaintiff will have distinct
goals for the claim. Nevertheless, in the vast majority of disputes over arbitra-
tion agreements, employee-plaintiffs are seeking to circumnavigate the clause,
while employer-defendants are trying to enforce arbitration.44 If arbitration were
truly an equal forum, would there be so much litigation over the enforcement of
an arbitration clause?
Arbitration proponents usually point to the relative overall cost-
advantage of arbitration, arbitration's advantage over the court system's inertia
in disposing of claims, and arbitration's simplicity of procedures.45 Generally,
opponents of arbitration concede these points, and instead argue that arbitration
clauses are usually unconscionable contracts of adhesion and that individual
rights go without vindication in arbitration proceedings. 46 However, the argu-
ments can cut both ways.
For example, pro-arbitration groups can find statistics to support the ar-
gument that plaintiffs' interests are better served in arbitration. According to a
43 "There are three kinds of lies: lies, damn lies, and statistics." Benjamin Disraeli, former
Prime Minister of Great Britain. Bartleby.com, The Columbia World of Quotations (1996),
http://www.bartleby.con 66/96/16796.html.
44 After reviewing a seemingly endless heap of arbitration-clause cases, the author is confident
to a reasonable degree of certainty in this assessment.
45 See, e.g., State ex rel. Saylor v. Wilkes, 613 S.E.2d 914 (W. Va. 2005). In Saylor, EDSI's
arbitration contract lists all of these advantages to arbitration in the contract itself. Id. at 917-19.
46 See id. Plaintiff makes both of these arguments in Saylor. Id.
2005]
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widely accepted study on private arbitration,47 plaintiffs get more than a fair
shake in alternative dispute resolution. Professor Lisa Bingham's statistics taken
from all nonunion employment disputes arbitrated by the American Arbitration
Association in 1992 reveal that plaintiffs prevail in arbitration more often than
in normal civil proceedings.48 To be more exact, from 1993-1995, plaintiffs fil-
ing claims against their employers prevailed 63% of the time in arbitration com-
pared to only 14.9% in federal district courts.49
On the other hand, a different published study of security industry arbi-
trations suggests otherwise. Overall plaintiff success rates were 57.6% in jury
trials to 53.2% in arbitrations, but wider margins appear in situations of dis-
crimination claims (44.4% to 26.1%), tort claims (47.1% to 17.9%), and con-
tract claims (59.0% to 41.0%).50
However, success or failure in an employment dispute cannot be quanti-
fied only in wins and losses. Although a plaintiff may "prevail" in a dispute, if
the plaintiff is shortchanged by a damage award, that is not success. For exam-
ple, a statistical picture of employment disputes from an anti-arbitration point of
view paints this image: the median award amount in arbitration was $49,000
compared with $264,000 in jury verdicts.51 In the Bingham study, the median
award was $49,000 in arbitration as opposed to $530,000 in federal district
courts.5 2
On the other hand, simply comparing award amounts is insufficient.53
Much like snowflakes, each employee claim is unique. Professor Bingham's
study realized this phenomenon and compared awards as a percentage of
amount originally demanded. Claims in arbitration received an average of 25%
of the original amount demanded, while claims resolved in federal district court
received an average of 70% of the original demand.54 Although these figures
weigh against arbitration, Professor Bingham discounts the figures according to
success rates55 to come up with "adjusted outcomes., 56 The adjusted outcome in
47 Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion Employment Disputes? An
Analysis of Actual Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT'L J. OF CONFLICT MGMT. 369 (1995).
48 Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REv 29, 46 (1998).
49 Id.
50 David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer
Rights Claims in An Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33, 64-66 (1997). The
statistical observation period ran from 1989 to 1994. Id. The survey results were issued by the
National Association of Securities Dealers and the New York Stock Exchange. Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See common argument comparing apples to oranges.
54 Schwartz, supra note 25, at 18.
55 Id. The success rate is 63% in arbitration versus 14.9% in federal district courts. Id.
[Vol. 108
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arbitration is 18% of original amount demanded compared with 10.4% in fed-
eral district court.57
This dizzying display of statistics makes at least one thing clear: a sim-
ple overview of figures paints an ambiguous picture as to whether employer or
employee holds any advantage in arbitration. Therefore, it seems unfair to force
a potential plaintiff to choose a forum before the employer commits an act that
gives rise to an employee claim. Moreover, when employment is preconditioned
upon acceptance of arbitration for disputes with the employer, the sting of un-
fairness becomes even more perceptible because the arbitration agreement com-
pels the employee to either settle future unknown disputes in the employer's
choice of forum or look for another job.
To illustrate, imagine that Heroine, during her application process at
Burger Bliss, tells Chester that she would like to work for him, but she is wary
of the arbitration clause. Heroine tells Chester that she will not begin work un-
der the current contract unless the arbitration clause is stricken. Not surpris-
ingly, Chester tells Heroine that maybe the Me Amore: Tacos restaurant down
the street is hiring. Heroine, if she insists on striking the arbitration clause, will
lose the job at Burger Bliss, and is stuck wearing her chunky black boots instead
of that perfect pair of brown leather heels.
C. "Pay For What You Get": Ensuring Due Process Concerns in Arbitra-
tion
Arbitration agreements are a serious legal matter because they remove
disputes from the consideration of a jury, a constitutionally-based right. 58 Fur-
thermore, a large portion of the animosity towards arbitration stems from the
fact that arbitrations lack uniform rules and procedures. 59 Opponents of arbitra-
tion perceive deprivation of a jury as an impairment to the allegedly wronged
employee because it is a waiver of a fundamental right. In waiving the right to a
jury trial, opponents fear that the arbitration process will deprive a potential
plaintiff of due process rights.
Lewis Maltby, Director of the National Task Force on Civil Liberties in
the Workplace, has detailed due process concerns generated by arbitrations.6 °
Employers can and often do provide completely internal means of resolving
56 Bingham, supra note 47, at 370. Adjusted outcome is the percentage of amount demanded
multiplied by the success rate. Id. In other words, plaintiffs win considerably more money out-
side of arbitration, but a "win" is much harder to achieve. Id.
57 Id.
58 The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article III, § 13 of the West Virginia
Constitution have similar language. Both preserve the right to a jury trial for suits at common law
for values in controversy exceeding twenty dollars. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; W.VA. CONST. art.
III, § 13.
59 See generally Maltby, supra note 48, at 33.
60 Id. at 32-34.
20051
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employee disputes. 6' Furthermore, because the employment contracts are
drafted by the employer for its benefit, employers often unilaterally decide who
will administer the arbitration, which rules and substantive law will govern the
arbitration, and which, if any, remedies or money damages are available.
62
Therefore, the proverbial ball is in the employer's court.
More often than not, employers prefer arbitration.63 Everyone agrees
that arbitration is more expedient and less costly because pretrial motion prac-
tice and discovery are eliminated and attorneys require less preparation time.
64
Also, because of the diminished preparation and presentation, plaintiffs' attor-
ney fees, which are sometimes part of the award, are less. 65 Additionally, as
mentioned above, award amounts are usually less in arbitration than in tradi-
tional jury trials.66
Employers also prefer arbitration because the arbitration forum presents
the defendant with a distinct home-court advantage. First, employers and their
attorneys arbitrate regularly, while plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys are rarely
do. 67 This disparity has the possibility of creating a repeat player advantage be-
cause the arbitrator's future business depends on the satisfaction of the entity
who hired the arbitrator.68 Second, because of the lower awards, plaintiffs' at-
torneys working for contingency fees are less likely to take cases committed to
arbitration.69 Therefore, plaintiffs must search harder for an attorney, usually
resulting in a lower quality of representation because, according to Mr. Maltby,
the better attorneys will gravitate towards the possibility of higher awards in
jury trials.70
Furthermore, arbitration plaintiffs face higher administrative CoStS.
7 1
Plaintiffs and defendants usually split the cost of arbitration, which includes
filing fees sometimes in the thousands and anywhere from $200 to $700 hourly
rates for the arbitrator.72 Additionally, arbitrations are private matters, so plain-




64 Schwartz, supra note 50, at 60.
65 Id.
66 See supra Part II.B.
67 Schwartz, supra note 50, at 60.
68 Id. at 61.
69 Id.
70 Maltby, supra note 48, at 32.
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One final advantage that defendants hold over plaintiffs is the unavail-
ability of the discovery process.74 Plaintiffs bear the burden of production of
evidence, and this task can be insurmountable without the compulsory discovery
process afforded by rules of civil procedure.75 Without discovery, plaintiffs may
be unable to obtain evidence that would have come to light and been dispositive
in a judicial forum. Therefore, forcing a dispute to arbitration may, in itself, be
outcome determinative of the claim.
With all of these advantages, it would be a foolish business practice not
to include arbitration agreements in employee contracts. According to David S.
Schwartz, ACLU Senior Staff Attorney, "[b]ecause corporations will typically
interact with small players through contracts of adhesion, there is a substantial
incentive to use form terms to lock in the advantages of arbitration in advance of
any dispute.
' 76
This is not to say that arbitration is completely unfair and biased to-
wards big business employers. Arbitration can be fair and advantageous strate-
gically and financially to a plaintiff. Clearly, arbitration provides more expedi-
ent results, lower or no attorney fees, and a less formal and strict proceeding.
Plaintiffs may sometimes prefer arbitration and in fact be better off in arbitra-
tion, so long as the proceeding is conducted fairly.
To that end, the United States Department of Labor released an in-depth
study of worker-employer relations and issued 7 criteria for fair arbitrations: (1)
a impartial arbitrator; (2) employee access to pertinent information rivaling the
discovery process in civil courts; (3) assurance of financial access to the system
through cost-sharing between claimants and defendants; (4) the right to inde-
pendent representation; (5) a full range of remedies comparable to those in civil
courts; (6) publication of the arbitrator's written opinions; and (7) adequate ju-
dicial review of the arbitration to ensure substantive law is not misapplied.77
If arbitration can be conducted in an even-handed manner, then plain-
tiffs would be more likely to accept arbitration. Employee-plaintiffs, perceiving
an inherent disadvantage in arbitrations, may sometimes seek to avoid the arbi-
tration clause. The unfairness with arbitration arises because employees are
forced to choose a forum before the employee is ever harmed by the employer.
Therefore, because of the high potential for unfairness to employees, American





77 COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 32, http://www.dol.gov/asp/prgrams/history/reich/reports/dunlop/setion4.htm
(last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
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D. "Save Me": The West Virginia Human Rights Act
In particular, courts should pay special attention to arbitration clauses
that waive rights to a jury trial in the case of legislatively enacted protections of
civil rights. The development of civil rights law depends in part on public reso-
lution of disputes.78 First, public resolution will specifically deter the individual
employer-defendant because there is an incentive for an employer to maintain a
favorable reputation.79 Second, public knowledge of a civil rights resolution will
generally deter all employers from engaging in discriminatory actions in order
to avoid being in disputes in the future.80
West Virginia has enacted a civil rights protection statute entitled West
Virginia Human Rights Act,8' which prevents employers from engaging in dis-
crimination among its employees based on "race, religion, color, national origin,
ancestry, sex, or age.",82 This act also lays out the procedures that an aggrieved
employee must follow in order to seek recourse from a discriminatory em-
ployee. 83 An employee must first file a complaint with the Human Rights com-
mission and then, once the employee has received a "right to sue letter," pro-
ceedings can commence in trial court.84
The West Virginia Supreme Court has ruled on what is necessary to
sustain a claim under the Human Rights Act:
In order to make a prima facie case of employment discrimina-
tion under the West Virginia Human Rights Act... the plaintiff
must offer proof of the following: (1) that the plaintiff is a
member of a protected class; (2) that the employer made an ad-
verse decision concerning the plaintiff; (3) but for the plaintiffs
protected status, the adverse decision would not have been
made. ,85
After a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of discrimination, the
burden shifts to the defendant-employer to present a "legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its actions., 86 If a defendant meets this burden, then
78 Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 395, 430-32 (1999).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 W. VA. CODE § 5-11-1, et seq. (2002). This statute supplements those protections afforded
by federal civil rights and employment discrimination statutes such as Title VII and the ADEA.
Id.
82 W.VA. CODE § 5-11-9.
83 W.VA. CODE § 5-11-10.
84 Id.
85 Syl. pt. 3, Conaway v. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 358 S.E.2d 423 (W. Va. 1986).
86 Freeman v. Fayette County Bd. of Educ., 599 S.E.2d 695, 700 (W. Va. 2004).
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the plaintiff is given an opportunity to prove that the defendant's reasons were
in fact discriminatory or pretextual.87
The West Virginia Human Rights Acts is an independent statutory basis
for a cause of action against an employer. The West Virginia Supreme Court has
held that, "[u]nder West Virginia law, an arbitration clause in an employment
contract cannot defeat a human rights action filed by the claimant pursuant to
[the Human Rights Act]. 88 The remainder of this Note will discuss the viability
of that holding in light of recent developments in arbitration clause jurispru-
dence.
III. "CRASH INTO ME": THE CONFLICT BETWEEN WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME
COURT AND UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASE LAW
In applying the FAA, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and
the U.S. Supreme Court have reached directly opposite conclusions. The differ-
ence arises in the interpretation of the exception for certain employment con-
tracts in 9 U.S.C. § 1.89 In Copley v. NCR Corp. the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held that the arbitration clause in Copley's employment con-
tract was not enforceable. 90 The Copley court based its decision on two distinct
grounds. First, the court construed the exemption language in § 1 to exclude all
employment contracts from the strictures of the FAA.91 Secondly, the West Vir-
ginia court held in Copley that statutory-based Human Rights Act claims are not
subject to arbitration.92
Conversely, the United States Supreme Court reached a contradictory
conclusion in Circuit City Stores v. Adams.93 In that decision the Supreme Court
held that the exception applies only to those workers specifically employed by
the transportation industry.94 In so deciding, the Supreme Court directly over-
ruled the first foundation underlying the West Virginia decision in Copley.
However, on the one hand, the West Virginia decision in Copley rests on the
grounds that claims arising under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are not
subject to arbitration.95 On the other hand, since Copley, the United States Su-
87 Id.
88 Syl. pt. 2, Copley v. NCR Corp., 394 S.E.2d 751, 752 (W. Va. 1990).
89 The ambiguous language that has proven to be troublesome to courts is: "[B]ut nothing
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (empha-
sis added).
90 Copley, 394 S.E.2d 751.
91 Id. at 753-55.
92 Id. at 755-56.
93 532 U.S. 105.
94 Id.
95 Syl. pt. 2, Copley, 394 S.E.2d 751.
20051
13
Johnson: Arbitration of Employer Violations of the West Virginia Human Rig
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
preme Court decided Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson-Lane Corp, which held that
federal statutory civil rights claims are valid subjects of arbitration. 96
Therefore, because the impact of Gilmer on West Virginia law is yet to
be determined, the question of whether a West Virginia Human Rights Act
claim is arbitrable remains open. West Virginia should remain steadfast in op-
posing arbitration of claims under this important workers' rights legislation.
Remembering Heroine's unfortunate situation, Hero should be given the oppor-
tunity to present the facts of Heroine's employment disaster to a jury and not to
a Burger Bliss appointed arbitrator. Doing so will help to fully vindicate her
rights and make strides in ensuring that Burger Bliss or other employers of simi-
lar ilk will not repeat the offenses.
A. "The Best of What's Around": The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals decision in Copley v. NCR Corp.: Human Rights Act Viola-
tions Are Not Arbitrable
In Copley v. NCR Corp., NCR employed Copley to sell computer hard-
ware and software. 97 NCR was a Maryland corporation that manufactured and
marketed computer products throughout the U.S.98 In December of 1981, NCR
assigned Copley to sell the products in the area surrounding his home base of
Charleston, West Virginia, which included parts of Ohio and Kentucky. 99
After about six years of employment in May of 1987, Copley filed a
complaint with the West Virginia Human Rights Commission (HRC) alleging
age and sex discrimination. 1°° Then, NCR fired Copley in October of 1987.10
As a result, Copley filed a reprisal complaint with the HRC against NCR, and
then, after he received his statutory "right to sue" letter from the HRC, Copley
filed a civil action against NCR and twelve other individual defendants in Ca-
bell County Circuit Court.10 2 Copley's complaint alleged breach of employment
contract, unlawful discriminatory practices, and retaliatory discharge. 
3
In pretrial motions, NCR filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant
to the arbitration agreement in Copley's employment contract.1°4 The trial court
96 500 U.S. 20 (1991). See infra Part III.C.
97 Copley, 394 S.E.2d at 752.
98 Id. at 753 n.6.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 752. Both age discrimination and sex discrimination are violations of the human
rights act. Because the West Virginia Supreme Court's review of the case was limited to an ap-
peal of the lower court's grant of a motion to compel arbitration, no factual record was available
to describe the actual circumstances that gave rise to Copley's complaint. See id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 752-53.
103 Id. at 753.
104 Id. The language of the arbitration agreement read: "Any controversy or claim arising out of
or relating to this contract, or the breach thereof, shall be settle [sic] by arbitration in accordance
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granted NCR's motion and stayed the proceedings in Copley's civil suit pending
the outcome of the arbitration. 0 5 Copley appealed to the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals seeking to avoid arbitration.
10 6
The court found two grounds for overturning the lower court's grant of
the motion to compel arbitration. First, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals ruled that the employment contracts exception in the FAA exempts all
employment contracts from forced arbitration.10 7 The court reasoned that be-
cause the parties did not dispute that Copley's dealings with NCR "constituted a
'transaction involving commerce' within the meaning of Section 2" of the FAA,
the issue was "whether the 'contracts of employment' exception contained in
Section 1 removes this controversy from the mandatory arbitration provision of
the [FAA].' ' 8 The court then stated, "[T]he parties do not cite, nor have we
found, any decision in which the [United States Supreme] Court explains the
meaning of the contracts of employment exception."' 9
Taking advantage of the clean slate, the Copley court held:
Under Section 1 of the Act, an exemption is provided for em-
ployment contracts of workers engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce. Mr. Copley's employment contract falls within the
exemption of Section 1. Accordingly, the circuit court had no
authority under the [FAA] to compel enforcement of the arbitra-
tion clause in Mr. Copley's employment contract.' 10
West Virginia adopted the view that "any other class of employees engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce" means exactly what it says. If an employee is
under contract to do work that involves foreign or interstate commerce, then the
arbitration clause in the employee's contract is not subject to arbitration pursu-
ant to the FAA."'
The next issue presented in Copley was "the more critical question [of]
whether an agreement to arbitrate contained in an employment contract can
usurp certain statutory rights given to an individual."'' 12 In deciding this issue,
the Copley court relied on three main sources of authority." 3 First, the court
with the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered by
the arbitrator may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof." Id. at 752 n.2.
105 ld. at 753.
106 Id.
107 Copley, 394 S.E.2d at 753.
108 Id.
109 Id.
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cited Davis v. Kitt Energy Corp.,' 14 which held, "A miner against whom an arbi-
tration decision has been rendered under a collective bargaining agreement in-
volving a safety claim is not foreclosed from pursuing a discrimination remedy
under W. Va. Code § 22A-lA-20."' 15 In other words, an arbitration clause or
even a final decision by an arbitrator in a collective bargaining agreement could
not extinguish a statutorily created cause of action, at least in the instance of
mine safety statutes.
Second, the Copley court cited Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,116 a
United States Supreme Court case holding that a collective bargaining agree-
ment to arbitrate does not supersede or waive a plaintiffs right to pursue civil
rights actions under Title VII." 7 Thirdly, the Copley court surveyed United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions and found that "[a] majority of the
federal courts of appeals have concluded that even where an employee is subject
to the [FAA], the contractual obligation to submit to arbitration cannot override
or defeat a civil rights claim."'"
8
Based on these three building blocks, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals decided in Copley that "we must conclude that under West Virginia
law, an arbitration clause in an employment contract cannot defeat a human
rights action filed by the claimant pursuant to W. Va. Code § 5-11-13(b)."119
This well-reasoned holding is supported by language in the Human Rights Act.
The Act has the significant purpose of deterring discrimination.1 20 Furthermore,
the Human Rights Commission (HRC), which is charged with enforcing the act,
also has a legislatively defined duty.'
2
'
114 365 S.E.2d 82 (W. Va. 1987). This case involved a coal miner who filed a claim of retalia-
tory discrimination pursuant to his rights under W. VA. CODE § 22A-1A-20 alleging that he had
been fired for reporting safety violations to the mine safety board. The defendant invoked the
arbitration clause in the miner's collective bargaining agreement. Id.
115 Id. at syl. pt. 4.
116 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
117 Copley, 394 S.E.2d at 756.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 W. VA. CODE § 5-11-2 (2002).
It is the public policy of the state of West Virginia to provide all of its citizens
equal opportunity for employment .... The denial of [human rights or civil
rights] to properly qualified persons by reason of race, religion, color, national
origin, ancestry, sex, age, blindness, disability or familial status is contrary to
the principles of freedom and equality of opportunity and is destructive to a
free and democratic society.
Id.
121 W. VA. CODE § 5-11-4 (2002).
The commission shall have the power and authority and shall perform the
functions and services as in this article prescribed and as otherwise provided
by law. The commission shall encourage and endeavor to bring about mutual
understanding and respect among all racial, religious and ethnic groups within
[Vol. 108
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If claims arising under the Act are forced to arbitration, the HRC will
never adjudicate them. With its jurisdiction over such claims revoked, the HRC
becomes a partial nullity. It can no longer perform its legislatively delegated
functions. Arbitration of Human Rights Act claims should continue to be disal-
lowed because arbitration will stifle the duties of the HRC and thereby partially
suffocate the development of West Virginia civil rights law.
B. "Say Goodbye": The United States Supreme Court Decision in Circuit
City Stores v. Adams: Claims Arising Under All Employment Contracts
Are Arbitrable
Ten years after the West Virginia decision in Copley, the Supreme
Court handed down the Circuit City opinion. In Circuit City, employee-plaintiff
Saint Clair Adams signed an employment application that contained an arbitra-
tion agreement before being hired as a sales counselor by Circuit City. 122 Two
years later, Adams brought a civil action in California state court alleging em-
ployment discrimination based on California statutory rights and general tort
theories.123
Circuit City responded by filing a suit in federal district court asking the
court to enjoin the state action and enforce the arbitration agreement pursuant to
the FAA. 124 During the pendency of this action, the Ninth Circuit handed down
Craft v. Campbell Soup Co.,125 which held, similarly to the Copley opinion, all
employment contracts are exempt from the requirements of the FAA. 126 As a
the state and shall strive to eliminate all discrimination in employment and
places of public accommodations by virtue of race, religion, color, national
origin, ancestry, sex, age, blindness or handicap and shall strive to eliminate
all discrimination in the sale, purchase, lease, rental or financing of housing
and other real property by virtue of race, religion, color, national origin, an-
cestry, sex, blindness, handicap or familial status.
Id.
122 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). The arbitration agreement read:
I agree that I will settle any and all previously unasserted claims, disputes or
controversies arising out of or relating to my application or candidacy for em-
ployment, employment and/or cessation of employment with Circuit City, ex-
clusively by final and binding arbitration before a neutral Arbitrator. By way
of example only, such claims include claims under federal, state, and local
statutory or common law, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, including the amend-
ments of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Americans with Disabilities Act,
the law of contract and [the] law of tort.
Id. at 109-10.
123 Id. at 110.
124 Id.
125 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
126 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 110.
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result, when the Circuit City case reached the Ninth Circuit, it followed Camp-
bell Soup in holding that Adams's employment application was a contract of
employment and therefore not subject to the FAA.127
The Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit, holding that the exemp-
tions in § 1 of the FAA apply to a narrow class of employees directly involved
in transportation industries. 128 The Court reached its conclusion because the
words "seamen" and "railroad workers" precede the contract of employment
exception. 129 Therefore, if Congress intended to give "seamen and railroad
workers" some meaning, then the exception was meant only to apply to trans-
portation workers. 130 The court reasoned that if Congress had wanted to exclude
all employment contracts, then the words "seamen and railroad workers" would
be superfluous, violating a rule of construction of statutes.
131
As a result, Circuit City stands for the proposition that the overwhelm-
ing majority of employment contracts are not exempt from the FAA's require-
ments to submit to arbitration. Therefore, as a general proposition, arbitration
clauses contained in employment contracts are enforceable, "save such grounds
as exist at law or in equity.' ' 132 This result is not as destructive of employees'
rights as the decisions that follow in Circuit City's aftermath. Courts are over-
worked and overcrowded, and some relief from impenetrable docket schedules
would be appropriate. However, there is a line in enforcing arbitration agree-
ments that should not be crossed.
C. "Let You Down": The Supreme Court Decision in Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp.: Statutory Based Discrimination Claims Can
Be Forced to Arbitration
After Circuit City,' 33 the West Virginia Supreme Court decision in Cop-
ley134 remained good law on the narrow point that Human Rights Act based
claims are not arbitrable. The viability of that portion of Copley was dealt a fur-
ther blow by the United States Supreme Court decision in Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp.135 In Gilmer, Interstate/Johnson Lane ("Interstate")
employed Gilmer in 1981 .136 As part of his employment requirements, Gilmer
filed an application to be a securities representative with the New York Stock
127 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999).
128 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119.
129 Id. at 114-15.
130 Id. at 121.
131 Id. at 114-15.
132 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
133 See supra Part IH.B.
134 See supra Part III.A.
135 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
136 Id. at 23.
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Exchange. 37 The application contained an arbitration clause stating that Gilmer
agreed to arbitrate any dispute arising between him and Interstate. 138 In 1987,
Interstate fired Gilmer, who was 62 years old at the time.139 Gilmer felt that his
termination was in violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA). 140 As a result, he filed an age discrimination charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), received a "right to sue"
letter from the EEOC, and subsequently filed suit in federal district court.1
4 1
In response, Interstate sought to enforce the arbitration clause in Gil-
mer's application with the NYSE. 142 The United States District for the Western
District of North Carolina denied Interstate's motion to compel arbitration, but
the Fourth Circuit reversed that decision, holding that "nothing in the text, legis-
lative history, or underlying purposes of the ADEA [indicates] a congressional
intent to preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements.,
143
The Supreme Court reached its decision in Gilmer keeping in mind the
"liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." 144 The Gilmer Court
looked to Sherman Act, Securities Exchange Act, and RICO decisions allowing
arbitration of claims under those federal statutes, concluding that "[I]t is by now
clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, en-
forceable pursuant to the FAA."
145
However, the Court left a small opening. "Although all statutory claims
may not be appropriate for arbitration," courts should enforce arbitration agree-
ments unless the party opposing arbitration can show that "'Congress itself has
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory
rights at issue."' 146 Therefore, the main holding of Gilmer is that the opponent
of arbitration of a federal statutory claim has the burden of showing that Con-
gress, through text, legislative history, or the underlying purpose of the act, in-
tended for claims under the Act to be adjudicated in a judicial forum only. 147
Petitioner Gilmer's argument ultimately failed. The Supreme Court did
not accept Gilmer's reasoning that the ADEA was an important avenue for pro-




140 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000).
141 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
142 Id. at 24.
143 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197 (1990).
144 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
145 Id. at 26.
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goals. 148 The Court was also not persuaded that the EEOC's functions would be
hindered or that the absence of written opinions in arbitrations would slow the
development of anti-discrimination law. 149 The Supreme Court's conclusions are
wrong. Civil rights disputes need to be resolved in public. Behind-closed-doors
arbitrations serve as disincentives to conform to civil rights standards because
the employer-defendant has no fear of being exposed publicly.
After the Gilmer decision, the status of the West Virginia decision in
Copley was up in the air because Copley also dealt with rights created under a
civil rights statute. Gilmer applied to a federal anti-discrimination statute.
50
However, after Gilmer the question in West Virginia is whether its state human
rights statute still protects employees from being forced to arbitration.
IV. "CRY FREEDOM": PREEMPTION OF STATE LAWS UNDER SOUTHLAND V.
KEATING AND ADKINS V. LABOR READY INC.
A. "The Last Stop": Southland and Federal Preemption of State Laws
Disfavoring Arbitration
Although Southland Corp. v. Keating' preceded Copley by six years,
its impact on Copley was not felt until after Gilmer was handed down. Put gen-
erally, Southland holds that all state statutes prohibiting arbitration are void be-
cause they are preempted by the FAA. 5 2  Southland involved a dispute by a
group of 7-Eleven franchisees against the owner and franchisor, Southland Cor-
poration. The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, a violation of the disclosure
requirements of California's Franchise Investment Act. 1
53
Contained in the franchising agreement, of course, was an agreement to
arbitrate disputes with the franchisor. 154 However, a provision in the California
Franchise Investment Act voided any agreements that waived rights granted
under the act, including agreements to arbitrate. 155 Therefore, there was a direct
conflict between the FAA, which required enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments, and California state law, which voided arbitration agreements in fran-
chising agreements. 1
56
148 Id. at 27-28.
149 Id. at 31-32.
150 Id. at 23.
151 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 4.
1 Id.
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The trial court in California compelled arbitration of all of Keating's
claims except the Franchise Act claim. 157 In doing so, the trial court held that the
provision in the law voided arbitration agreements. 5 8 The intermediate appeals
court reversed on the grounds that the California law did not void arbitration
agreements, and even if the California law did void arbitration agreements, then
that law violated the Supremacy Clause and would be stricken. 159 The California
Supreme Court then reversed the appeals court.' 6° In doing so, the court relied
on the interpretation that the California law required judicial consideration of
claims and that there was no Supremacy Clause conflict between the FAA and
the state statute.
61
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, although its jurisdiction over the
case is arguably premised on shaky grounds. 162 The Court held that California's
decision that its law requires a judicial forum "directly conflicts with § 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act and violates the Supremacy Clause. 1 63 The opinion
further states, "Congress ... withdrew the power of the states to require a judi-
cial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to
resolve by arbitration."' 64
This precedent seems to discredit any argument that a state statute could
trump any contractual agreement to arbitrate. However, Southland preceded the
West Virginia decision in Copley. Southland's reasoning was fully available to
the West Virginia Supreme Court at the time of Copley, but the West Virginia
court chose not to adopt Southland. There is no mention of Southland in the
Copley opinion. This curious omission allows plenty of speculation about why
Southland did not control the West Virginia court's decision in Copley.
Possibly, the West Virginia court reasoned that civil rights claims are a
different matter than franchising agreements because more social policies and
importance surround resolutions of civil rights claims. This reasoning is sug-
gested by the West Virginia court's reliance on the United States Supreme Court
decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 65 The West Virginia court cited
the following language: "Title VII ... concerns not majoritarian processes, but
an individual's right to equal employment opportunity .... [Wlaiver of these
rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII.' 166
157 Id. at 4.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 5.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 See Schwartz, supra note 25, at 9.
163 Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
164 Id.
165 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding that prior final judgment in an arbitration did not preclude
pursuing a Title VII claim arising from the same factual occurrence).
166 Copley v. NCR Corp., 394 S.E.2d 751, 756 (1990) (quoting Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51-52).
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Furthermore, the Copley opinion cites authority throughout the federal
appeals courts supporting the proposition that civil rights claims are not subject
to the requirements of the FAA. 167 It is possible, then, that the West Virginia
court found no Supremacy Clause conflict because the FAA itself did not re-
quire civil rights claims to be forced to arbitration. Thus, any state rule to the
same effect would be in opposition to the federal law. However, since the hold-
ing in Gilmer that federal civil rights actions are arbitrable, that line of reason-
ing is questionable.
B. "Some Devil": Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc. and Its Effect on West Vir-
ginia Law
In Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 68 Labor Ready, a company who organ-
izes day laborers so that potential employers could easily find manual labor for
short periods of time, entered into employment arrangements with plaintiffs.
Labor-Ready required its employees to sign employment applications acknowl-
edging that employment was on a day-to-day basis. 69 Also, the agreements
stated that at the end of each day, the employees would be deemed to have quit,
and that any and all disputes arising between the employee and Labor Ready
would be settled by arbitration. 170
The plaintiffs felt that they were being paid inadequately and in viola-
tion of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 7 1 and the West Virginia
Minimum Wage and Maximum Hours for Employees172 law. 173 As a result, they
filed suit, and Labor Ready filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the dis-
trict court granted. 174 After failing on other arguments, plaintiffs argued that the
FLSA and state statutory based claims are not subject to arbitration. 175
That argument was ill received by the Fourth Circuit. The court looked
to Gilmer176 and held that the plaintiffs must show congressional intent to pre-
clude arbitration or an inherent conflict between the statute's purpose and arbi-
tration. 177 Citing similarities between the FLSA and the ADEA that was at issue
in Gilmer, the Fourth Circuit did not accept the plaintiffs' reasoning that these
167 Id. at 756.
168 303 F.3d 496, 499 (4th Cir. 2002).
169 Id. at 499-500.
170 Id. at 500.
171 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
172 W. VA. CODE § 21-5C-1 to 11 (2002).
173 Adkins, 303 F.3d at 499.
174 Id. at 499-500.
175 Id. at 506.
176 See supra Part III.C.
177 Adkins, 303 F.3d at 506.
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specific statutory claims are exempted from the FAA by virtue of their underly-
ing intent. 178
Finally, the plaintiffs cited Copley in support of the argument that West
Virginia statutory based claims are not subject to arbitration.' 79 The Fourth Cir-
cuit rejected that argument, stating, "Whatever force Copley may formerly have
had, its ruling on arbitration cannot trump Gilmer and Circuit City v. Adams.18
0
The Supremacy Clause precludes any argument to the contrary." 18' Apparently,
before the FAA could be read to trump the West Virginia holding in Copley that
Human Rights Act claims are not arbitrable, the FAA needed the judicial gloss
applied by Gilmer. In other words, until the Gilmer decision, there was no fed-
eral policy that workplace civil rights violations could be arbitrated.
Although the language in Adkins seems to erode any viability left in
Copley, that opinion may still have life. First, the opinion in Adkins was handed
down by the Fourth Circuit, not the West Virginia court, due to the diversity
among the parties. Second, the damning language in Adkins could be interpreted
as dicta. None of the claims presented by the plaintiffs in Adkins are human
rights based claims. Therefore, were the West Virginia court to hear another
case, it could distinguish the Fourth Circuit's holding in Adkins.
Furthermore, the case of Marusa v. Chicken of Summersville 82 suggests
that Copley is alive and well. In Marusa, female employees of a Kentucky Fried
Chicken restaurant in Summersville, West Virginia were allegedly subjected to
sexual harassment while on the job, which would be a violation of the West
Virginia human rights act. 183 The employees' contract contained an arbitration
agreement, and Chicken of Summersville filed a motion in Nicholas County
Circuit Court to compel arbitration of the claims.1'84
The issue in the case was whether the human rights act violations were
subject to the arbitration provisions, and after hearing arguments on the motion,
the learned trial judge certified that specific question to the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals. 85 In the certification, the trial court cited Copley in
answering that the Human Rights Act claims are not subject to arbitration,
meaning that if the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals failed to accept the
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 See supra Part III.B.
181 Adkins, 303 F.3d at 506.
182 West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals No. 0401569, (Sept. 30, 2004),
http://www.state.wv.uswvsca/calendar/sept3OO4r.htm. The author attended hearings and
read briefs filed in Chicken of Summersville. The facts herein are gleaned from personal knowl-
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questions, then a trial would move forward in spite of the arbitration agree-
ments. 
1 86
The five-member supreme court rejected the opportunity to answer the
certified questions on September 30, 2004 by a vote of 3-2.187 Although that
decision has no effect on West Virginia law, it can be inferred that the West
Virginia court, in light of Southland, Gilmer, and Adkins, still finds its holding
in Copley good law. Had the court felt that Copley was dead letter, then it likely
would have accepted the case and asserted as much. However, as it stands, Cop-
ley's effect can still be felt in the West Virginia trial courts.
C. "Steady As We Go": West Virginia Holds Serve in State ex rel. Saylor v.
Wilkes: Certain Arbitration Contracts are Unenforceable as Uncon-
scionable Adhesion Contracts
In the spring of 2005, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
handed down State ex rel. Saylor v. Wilkes.' 88 In Saylor, a young woman en-
tered into an employment agreement to be a server with Ryan's Family Steak-
house in Martinsburg, West Virginia.1 89 As part of her pre-employment forms
Saylor was given a form contract already filled out as between Ryan's employee
and Employment Dispute Service, Inc. (EDSI) that bound her to arbitrate any of
her em ployment-related claims that may arise in the course of her employ-
ment.
After six months of employment, Saylor was allegedly sexually har-
assed by her supervisor, resulting in her constructive discharge.' 9' Saylor filed a
declaratory judgment action seeking to declare her arbitration contract with
EDSI unenforceable because arbitrating her claim would fail to vindicate her
individual civil rights and because the arbitration contract was an unconscion-
able contract of adhesion. 92 The trial court refused Saylor's request and entered
an order forcing the dispute to arbitration, and Saylor filed an original writ of
prohibition in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals seeking to avoid
arbitration.' 93
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals sided with Saylor, hold-
ing that the arbitration contract lacked consideration. 194 The court held that be-
cause the contract was between a woman with a tenth-grade education and a
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 613 S.E.2d 914 (W.Va. 2005).
189 Id. at 917.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 919.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 924.
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national restaurant chain, because the contract was between Saylor and EDSI,
not Ryan's, and because Ryan's only consideration given to Saylor for signing
the contract was that Ryan's would merely consider her employment applica-
tion, the contract was unconscionable.
195
The Saylor court avoided the Federal Arbitration Act and its subsequent
jurisprudence because it voided the contract "on grounds that exist at common
law," to wit, unconscionability. The court noted Saylor's argument that arbitra-
tion would fail to vindicate her individual rights, but the court never reached a
decision on that particular point. 196 Therefore, Copley's holding that Human
Rights Act violations are not subject to arbitration may not be affected by Say-
lor. If nothing else, Saylor reinforces West Virginia will look carefully and
skeptically at arbitration agreements in employment contracts.
V. "THE SPACE BETWEEN": SUGGESTIONS TO THE WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME
COURT TO MAINTAIN JUDICIAL RESOLUTIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACT CLAIMS
At the heart of the struggle over arbitration is the familiar conflict be-
tween the freedom of contract and governmental paternalism. It is important to
remember that an arbitration agreement is a waiver of important fundamental
rights, and a waiver of such rights should be intensely scrutinized for fairness. It
is less than convincing that a vague arbitration agreement, which is a precondi-
tion to employment, can constitute a fair waiver. However, courts have not been
receptive to unconscionability arguments. 197
Therefore, in order to strive towards fairness, West Virginia should
maintain its holding that Human Rights Act violations are not subject to arbitra-
tion clauses. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has long recognized
that the West Virginia state constitution affords more protections to its citizens
than the federal constitution. 98 As a result, the West Virginia court should try to
find state constitutional grounds to create a safe harbor for its ruling on Human
Rights Act claims.
Failing that absolute protection, some concessions may be made to arbi-
tration proponents, but the concessions should be carefully meted out. For ex-
ample, one theory looks to the actual language of the arbitration agreement,
distinguishing between a narrow agreement and a broad agreement. Coffman v.
Provost Umphrey Law Finn, L.L.P. explains how the Fifth Circuit deals with
arbitration agreements. 99 A narrow arbitration clause uses words like "disputes
195 Id. at 922, 924.
196 Id. at 919.
197 See supra Part II.A. But see Saylor, 613 S.E.2d 914; supra Part IV.C.
198 See, e.g., Pushinsky v. West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 266 S.E.2d 444, 449 (W. Va.
1980).
199 161 F. Supp.2d. 720 (E.D. Tex. 2001). This case dealt with the status of arbitration agree-
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arising out of this contractual agreement," while broad clauses use language like
"any dispute that arises out of or relates to the agreement or disputes that are in
connection with the agreement.
' 200
In Coffman, the Fifth Circuit favored the West Virginia stance on arbi-
tration, holding that a narrow arbitration clause is not sufficient to force a hu-
man rights statutory claim to arbitration. The reasoning is that the claim does
not "arise out of' the contract; it arises out of the statute.2 °1 In order to waive
legislatively created rights, the waiver must be specific and knowing.20 2 A broad
language arbitration clause that spells out specifically that discrimination claims
will be arbitrated is probably needed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Employment dispute arbitrations, in theory, are an alternate means to
resolving disputes by wading through the cumbersome and lethargic judicial
system. In a perfect world, this alternate forum would be a fair and even-handed
venue for quick disposal of claims in a more cost-effective manner. However,
factors, including the "repeat player syndrome" and lack of front-end bargaining
equality, can aggregate and skew arbitration proceedings toward an employer-
defendant.
Although freedom of contract notions usually uphold the enforcement
of arbitration agreements, a special concern arises in the context of civil rights
violations by the employer. The West Virginia legislature, noticing the impor-
tance of preventing arbitrary discrimination in the workplace, enacted the West
Virginia Human Rights Act. Because of the special purposes laid out in the act
supporting its enactment and because of the duties bestowed upon the West Vir-
ginia Human Rights Commission, forcing claims under this Act to arbitration
will undermine its purpose. West Virginia, even in the face of United States
Supreme Court case law that arguably demands otherwise, should maintain its
position that Human Rights Act claims are properly resolved in the traditional
judicial forum.
As a result, Hero, the lawyer, will be able to obtain a full adjudication of
the rights of Heroine, his client. Burger Bliss, thanks to the public's access to
the traditional courts, will receive bad press as a result of its discriminatory acts.
Furthermore, thanks to written opinions and public proceedings that are unavail-
able in arbitration, the development of civil rights law in West Virginia will
march on. Thus, Heroine in accepting future employment, can rest assured that
the law will adequately protect all of her civil rights, including the endless pur-
suit for that perfect pair of brown leather heels.
200 Id. at 725.
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